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Abstract
Since the end of the Cold War, the Air Force has sought out efficiencies across
multiple processes to transform into a cost-effective force. However, processes
applicable to the Minuteman III (MM III) weapon system have only recently seen efforts
to increase effectiveness. The purpose of this research is to investigate whether the use of
third generation maintenance concepts could benefit the sustainment of the MM III
through its planned retirement around 2030. Primary and secondary sources outlining the
history of the strategic missile force and its current state were collected. Themes from
each era were analyzed using Prospect Theory as a means to understand the past and
interpret the current state. The resulting interpretation led to propositions on how third
generation maintenance concepts could be applied to the sustainment of the MM III as
well as benefit its planned replacement, the Ground Based Strategic Deterrent (GBDS)
program.
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IMPROVING MINUTEMAN III MAINTENANCE CONCEPTS

I. Introduction
Background
The Minuteman III (MM III) Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) system
has been existence since the 1970s and, in some cases, the infrastructure buried below
ground has been retrofitted from old Minuteman I facilities which date back to the 1960s.
As a system with strategic importance to the deterrence policy of the United States, the
reliability of each weapon and its associated infrastructure is critical (Phillips, Rehmert,
Waller, Bergdolt, & Walston, 2011). Additionally, the MM III is expected to provide
strategic deterrence through at least 2030 when its replacement, the GBSD (Ground
Based Strategic Deterrence), is projected to become operational (Woolf, 2015). With the
increasing age of the MM III and the GBSD’s expected lifespan of at least 50 years, the
ability for maintenance personnel to adequately sustain this deterrence force has strategic
implications for the United States foreign policy.
However, since the end of the Cold War, the nuclear enterprise as a whole has
degraded due to lack of oversight, funding, and modernization. The Honorable Frank
Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, stated
in a 2014 speech to the Air Force Association Conference and Exposition that:
…it has become clear to Secretary Hagel and DOD’s senior leadership that a
consistent lack of investment and support for our nuclear forces for far too many
years has left us with little margin to cope with mounting stresses…For too long,
our leaders have not [done] enough to support the missileers and the others
involved in this enterprise - overlooking career paths, compensation, decaying
infrastructure, and small unit leadership that are mission-critical (Kendall, 2014).
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Because of this lack of investment in infrastructure and modernization throughout
the nuclear triad, many systems, including the MM III, have outlived their original
service life and are in need of an updated replacement (Woolf, 2015). Though the United
States made a commitment in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review to work towards a world
without nuclear weapons and to deemphasize their use in the national security strategy,
the focus must be on maintain a safe, secure, and effective force until such weapons are
removed from the arsenal (Department of Defense, 2010). Admiral Cecil D. Haney, the
former Commander of United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), reiterated
this sentiment in testimony before the Senate Committed on Armed Services on 19
March 2015, stating that:
The likelihood of major conflict with other nuclear powers is remote today, and
the ultimate U.S. goal remains the achievement of a world without nuclear
weapons. Until that day comes, the U.S. requires a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent force, even as it continues to reduce its nuclear stockpile and the
number of deployed nuclear warheads. (Haney, 2015)
Admiral Haney continued by stating:
We must commit to investments that will allow us to maintain this infrastructure
in a safe and secure way for as long as nuclear weapons exist, or risk degrading
the deterrent and stabilizing effect of a credible and capable nuclear force. Today
we spend less than 3 percent of the DOD budget on nuclear capabilities. As
stated by the Congressional Budget Office, recapitalization investments that are
necessary to ensure safety and security will increase this number to “roughly 5 to
6 percent.” (Haney, 2015)
Significant nuclear weapon system modernization is already underway to produce
a new ballistic missile submarine, a stealth bomber force, and a replacement ICBM.
Additionally, there are significant acquisition efforts within the Air Force for other
weapon systems such as the F-35, the KC-46, and the T-X. With these high-cost
acquisition programs, the fight for dollars to fulfill all requirements is strained (Mehta,
2

2016a). Additionally, the maintenance costs of legacy weapon systems (such as the F16) until their modernized counterparts (e.g. the F-35) are operational has been shown to
be increasing, thus increasing the stress on the DOD’s budget (Versprille, 2016). This
statement is also true for the MM III, as depicted in Figure 1, which indicates that
Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs have nearly doubled between 1996 and 2016
(AFTOC, 2017).

Figure 1. MM III O&M and Personnel Costs
The maintenance policy governing ICBM sustainment has highly favored a runto-failure model where the performed maintenance is in reaction to a system breaking.
Because of the lack of modernization coupled with aging infrastructure, the maintenance
and sustainment communities have experienced increased difficulty in ensuring the high
levels of reliability demanded by the strategic posture of the United States under such a
policy. Thus, this research will explore a modernized maintenance policy utilizing
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM), and Condition-Based Maintenance (CBM) as
an option to aid in extending the life of the MM III. Additionally, by incorporating these
3

techniques prior to the deployment of the GBSD, lessons learned and best practices can
be applied to the future system.
Problem Statement
The problem facing the ICBM sustainment community is that the maintenance
policy currently utilized in support of the MM III is reactive in nature and does not
leverage technology to detect/predict failure. Thus, RCM and CBM concepts are applied
to the ICBM construct in order to answer the question of how these principles may be
implemented to develop a preventative maintenance policy rather than a reactive policy.
Research Questions
1. Can MM III sustainment managers leverage RCM methods to provide the
required level of readiness at an appropriate cost?
2. Can existing CBM technologies can be applied to the MM III and GBSD in
order to effectively sustain the weapon systems?
Research Focus
The scope of this research concentrates on a holistic view of the weapon system
due to the complexity and magnitude of components that make up the entire MM III
system. Additionally, this research is not intended to determine specific reliability levels
nor to surmise what technologies should be leveraged. Instead, the focus of this research
will center around whether or not RCM and CBM are viable solutions to pursue in order
to improve MM III sustainment.
The GBSD is not considered to be a primary focus of this research. This is
because the components that will make up this new weapon system are still in the
4

conceptual phase of development. However, because the GBSD acquisition program is
considered to be a recapitalization of the existing infrastructure, the GBSD must be
included in this research.
Methodology
This research utilizes the case study method as a means to investigate the situation
surrounding ICBM sustainment to answer the research questions listed above. To answer
the research questions listed earlier, a comprehensive history of policies and actions
regarding the ICBM community is compiled using sources such as policy documents,
senior leader statements, and cost data. Such a compilation attempts to incorporate
policies, procedures, personnel and systems information into a balanced historical view
from the beginning of the nuclear enterprise through 1992. Doing so allows the
researchers to analyze that information through a theoretical lens in order to reduce bias
within the research.
After doing so, the same nature of information is gathered for the current state of
the ICBM community from 1992 through the present day. This compiled information
concerning the current state is also viewed through an appropriate theoretical lens to
develop a group of expectations for the current and future state of the ICBM community.
From this, the researchers utilize these expectations, as projected through theory, to
determine if there is support for the research questions and to develop any
recommendations based on that determination.
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Assumptions/Limitations
Discussion regarding the nuclear enterprise and the future of defense spending for
a nuclear deterrent force is currently abundant. As such, the current state of policies and
funding regarding the nuclear enterprise in general and the MM III weapon system
specifically is a constantly changing target. Therefore, a limitation of this research is that
while it attempts to obtain a comprehensive view of the current state, recent events may
not be entirely captured. As such, swift changes in the political landscape could result in
differing outcomes when a theoretical perspective is applied.
The ability for maintenance tasks to be performed on a weapon system depends
heavily on the ability of the supply chain network to be able to provide the required
components at the correct time. Additionally, trained and qualified maintenance
personnel are needed to perform the task required. While inherently linked, the research
did not investigate the ability for the supply chain to adapt to a change in maintenance
policy nor other resource requirements such as personnel.
Lastly, much of this research requires secondary sources that interpret the nuclear
enterprise, ICBM sustainment, and other topics related to this thesis. Though primary
sources such as technical orders, Air Force Instructions, and policy documents were
preferred, secondary sources were used to fill in gaps in the research. As such, the
assumption is made that these secondary sources were accurate and limited in their
potential bias.
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Implications
The MM III sustainment community is a vast and complex system of personnel,
policies, and procedures. Additionally, it involves a diverse group of roles and
responsibilities that touch multiple functional areas of a bureaucratic system intended to
allow for progress but limit organizational agitation produced by frequent radical
changes. This research intends to determine if a shift in the fundamental maintenance
policies governing MM III sustainment could benefit the nuclear enterprise and nuclear
deterrence. Implications of such a determination would span the entire sustainment
community and could even affect the operational community and deterrence policies.
However, even rejection of the research questions would be able to provide the ICBM
community with beneficial information as they progress through the acquisition of the
GBSD and the retirement of the MM III.
Summary
This chapter emphasizes the issue of aging infrastructure and the costs associated
with sustaining legacy systems as well as modernization within the nuclear enterprise. It
also outlines the scope of the research and the associated research questions while stating
the assumptions, limitations, and possible implications. Chapter II explores the historical
nature of the nuclear enterprise, the decline in focus on nuclear matters and the
subsequent re-emphasis on nuclear policy. Additionally, it presents the relevant literature
on RCM, CBM, and current MM III maintenance policies. Lastly, it investigates
Prospect Theory as a tool to interpret the relevant literature. Chapter III discusses the
specific methodology performed during this research. Chapter IV presents the results and
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findings while Chapter V summarizes the research and provides additional areas for
research.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter reviews literature relevant to the research questions with respect to
the ICBM community as well as RCM and CBM. First, a description of the MM III
weapon system is portrayed in order for the reader to gain a basic technical
understanding. Next, a historical review of the ICBM force will explore the decline and
subsequent revival of focus on the nuclear enterprise. By doing so, one can attempt to
better understand the current state of the ICBM sustainment community and its associated
maintenance practices. Additional research will focus on recent studies that were
intended to increase the efficiency of operations within the ICBM force. This chapter
also reviews the principles of RCM and CBM and their effect on maintenance policies.
This framework is essential to understanding the principles explored later in this research.
Lastly, this chapter explores Prospect Theory as a tool to be used throughout this
research.
MM III Physical Description
The silo-launched ICBM has been a mainstay of the United States’ strategic
deterrence policy since the early 1960s when the first Minuteman I missiles were placed
on alert. The current system employed by the Air Force, the MM III, is comprised of two
main facilities that house the majority of systems and components that make up the
weapon system. The first is the Launch Facility (LF) which is an unmanned silo and
associated equipment that is used to house and launch the LGM-30 missile and its
payload. A vertical launch tube, a Launcher Support Building (LSB), and Launcher
9

Equipment Room (LER) are the three main areas that comprise the LF and are all buried
underground. The LSB and LER contain power, environmental control, and
communication systems critical to the operation and launch of the missile within the
launch tube.
The second facility is the Missile Alert Facility (MAF) which is a manned
building housing missileers who monitor weapon system status and, if directed by the
president, can execute a missile launch. Depending on the design, some MAFs house
both the building containing the missileers (known as the Launch Control Capsule
(LCC)) and the associated support and launch equipment (known as the Launch Control
Equipment Building (LCEB)), underground. However, older designs have much of the
equipment found in the LCEB above ground in what is known as the Launch Control
Support Building (LCSB).
Conceptually, these facilities and the equipment contained within them are very
similar to most any other facility found throughout the Air Force. Each facility contains
structural aspects such as walls and support columns, power systems that ensure the
ability to operate, HVAC systems which ensure the proper environmental controls for
both the missileers and the missile itself, and there are redundant communication systems
that ensure connectivity for launch orders. Additionally, there are overlaid security
systems to monitor and detect threats due to the sensitive nature of the weapon system.
However, because much of the facilities and their associated equipment are underground,
there are unique issues facing the sustainment and maintainability of the weapon system
outside of the normal wear out facing similar systems. Colonel Jeff Frankhouser, a
former ICBM maintenance group commander, stated “Take a 40-year-old home, now
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bury it in the ground. Then figure out what your challenges are. We’ll have those”
(Pappalardo, 2011).
Another challenge facing the maintenance personnel supporting the MM III is that
the MAFs and LFs are geographically separated from their main support base (MSB).
Though some locations are less than a 30-minute drive, the furthest locations can be in
excess of a three-hour drive in ideal conditions and even more with impaired driving
conditions from the poor weather that is common at such sites, especially in the winter.
This geographic separation introduces a multitude of considerations unique to ICBM
maintenance that other Air Force maintenance units do not have.
History of the Nuclear Enterprise
Though the development and wartime use of nuclear weapons during World War
II are well known, the path from development to today is not. From Strategic Air
Command (SAC) through the Cold War and into the 21st Century, the overall focus on
nuclear weapons and the policies of each presidential administration have varied over the
years.
Post-World War II
In the early aftermath of World War II, the U.S. Army Air Forces established the
Strategic Air Command whose focus was to be able to execute long range offensive
operations using atomic weapons. Though early demonstrations to execute this mission
were lackluster at best, under the guidance of General Curtis LeMay, the accuracy of
nuclear bombing exercises went from missing the target by over two miles in 1947 to
coming within 2,000 feet of the target by 1949 (Keeney, 2012). Under General LeMay,
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SAC developed into a premier organization with the strictest of standards. The
leadership demanded a standard of perfection and deviations from that standard were
dealt with quickly (Meilinger, 2014).
The Cold War
SIOP-62 was the war plan developed under the Eisenhower administration which
detailed the targeting and execution of a massive strike against Russian and Chinese
forces. Under the Kennedy administration, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara
pushed for the war plan to become more flexible and include a second-strike capability
built around ICBMs as well as submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) (Burns &
Siracusa, 2013). This new war plan, known as SIOP-63, increased SAC’s responsibility
and saw the development and integration of silo-based ICBMs into SAC. This missile
force, being tasked with a second-strike, retaliatory mission, received the same scrutiny
of perfection from SAC as the bomber force under General LeMay.
This nuclear triad formed the basis for American nuclear deterrence policy
throughout the rest of the Cold War and still exists today. Each leg on its own has
strengths and weaknesses as shown in Table 1. However, when organized together, they
form a strong cohesion that provides stable deterrence pressure to rational international
actors.
The following presidential administrations saw tensions with Russia ebb and flow
based on increased stockpile levels, increased weapon yields, and enhanced defensive
capabilities, such as anti-ballistic missile systems designed to defeat ICBM strikes. In
1974, President Nixon published NSDM-242 which stated that “The fundamental mission
of the U.S. nuclear force is to deter nuclear war…” and that the strategic posture needed a
12

survivable ICBM force for “…protection and coercion during and after major nuclear
conflict” (Nixon, 1974). As such, the strictest adherence to technical guidance in
operations, maintenance, and security was required within the ICBM community to
ensure the highest level of readiness. The SAC Munitions Officer Handbook offers
insight into the mindset expected within SAC and the ICBM community. Statements
such as ‘be prepared for war,’ ‘be tough,’ and ‘don’t tolerate incompetence’ are extensive
throughout the handbook (Belisle & Hickman, n.d.).

Bomber •
•
•
SLBM

•

ICBM

•
•
•
•

Table 1. Strengths and Weaknesses of the Nuclear Triad
Strengths
Weaknesses
Only recallable nuclear force
• Requires the most time to bring
on alert
Ability to forward deploy as a
show of force
• Least survivable
Able to be dispersed prior to attack • Easiest to counter once
launched
Considered the most
• Few subs on alert at any given
survivable/assured retaliation
time
Prompt launch capability
• Limited number of warheads
Large geographic dispersion able
• Immobile and easily targetable
to absorb a nuclear attack
• No ability to show escalation
Fastest launch capability
High warhead count

The Post-Cold War Environment
In the early 1990s, there began a shift away from the strict adherence to standards
that was the bedrock of SAC. With the dissolution of SAC in 1992, the Air Force’s
nuclear entities were split primarily between two Major Commands, with the bomber
force falling under Air Combat Command (ACC) and the ICBM force falling under Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC). Additionally, the closure of San Antonio Air Logistics
Center in 1995 disbanded the focal point of nuclear logistics and decentralized control
13

among six separate organizations (Defense Science Board Permanent Task Force on
Nuclear Weapons Surety, 2011).
With the swift and overwhelming victory of the Gulf War led by new precision
strike capabilities, the purview of leadership over the nuclear forces began to waiver.
Early in the post-Gulf War environment, some within the Air Force identified a sense of
false security and called for caution to not allow the deterioration of nuclear capabilities
(Paulsen, 1994). It became common thought among civilian and military organizations
that future wars would be quick endeavors won by the increasingly technological
precision strike forces and that nuclear deterrence was a relic of the past. This became
evident in 2001 when the Nuclear Posture Review under President George W. Bush
called for a fundamental shift in thinking to a New Triad which incorporated nuclear
forces, non-nuclear forces, and defense infrastructure as the three areas that would
provide strategic deterrence in a rapidly changing international security environment
(Department of Defense, 2002).
The 2000s Through Present Day
Towards the end of the 2000s, two events transpired which highlighted the
degradation within the nuclear enterprise. In 2006, four MM III critical components were
mistakenly sent to Taiwan instead of UH-1 helicopter batteries and were not discovered
missing until 18 months after the shipment occurred. Additionally, in 2007 six nuclear
warheads were flown from Minot AFB to Barksdale AFB within cruise missiles loaded
on a B-52. In subsequent reviews, lack of attention to detail, failure to follow prescribed
technical procedures, and an overall lack of leadership and oversight in the nuclear
enterprise were found to be common among Air Force operations, maintenance, and
14

logistics organizations tasked with nuclear missions (Defense Science Board Permanent
Task Force on Nuclear Weapons Surety, 2011). Additionally, shifting priorities had left
the nuclear enterprise and policy makers facing $100 billion worth of modernization
decisions without first-hand experience in such matters (Office of the Under Secretary for
Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2008).
Many reports from this timeframe had a common theme, that the Air Force and
USSTRATCOM “…should restore the rigor and focus necessary to reestablish and
sustain the demanding proficiency necessary for nuclear operations” (Office of the Under
Secretary for Acquisition Technology and Logistics, 2008). From this, the Air Force
decided to partially return to a SAC-like structure where most organizations with a
nuclear or non-nuclear, long-range strike mission and those logistics organizations that
directly supported that mission would fall under one MAJCOM known as Air Force
Global Strike Command (AFGSC).
According to the literature, there are still issues within the nuclear enterprise
related to morale, discipline, and attention to detail. One recent example of this is the
cheating that occurred at an ICBM base where missile operators were found to be
distributing answers to monthly proficiency checks (Holmes, 2014). Efforts from
AFGSC and the Air Force to improve these personnel issues (such as the Force
Improvement Program) have seen success in bringing about change to the culture of the
nuclear enterprise (Raatz, 2015).
Currently, the focus has shifted away from personnel issues to infrastructure and
modernization issues. Underinvestment over the past two decades has left the nuclear
forces in need of modernization to sustain strategic nuclear deterrence. An open letter
15

signed by eight former commanders of SAC and USSTRATCOM declares that based on
the actions of Russia, China, and North Korea, the need for a modernized nuclear triad is
clear and that a lack of modernization or an outright removal of one leg would be
inherently detrimental to US security (Kehler et al., 2017). However, as mentioned
earlier in Chapter I, the costs associated with such acquisition efforts may employ up to
6% of the DOD budget in coming years.
MM III Divergence from Air Force Sustainment Best Practices
As stated earlier, the MM III utilizes technology from the 1960s in order to
remain on alert and ready as a viable nuclear deterrence force. Throughout its life cycle,
there have been programs to modernize or replace many components of the system and
associated test equipment. For example, the Environmental Control System (ECS) within
both the MAF and LF was designed with a 10-year service life and only saw one
modification in the mid-80s (Systems Engineering and Technical Analysis Staff, 2004).
A replacement ECS system was fielded in the early 2010s due to a lack of replacement
parts and increasing failure rates. Similar programs have been performed on missile
components and C2 systems to ensure a viable launch function in a nuclear war
environment.
While it is common among aging Air Force weapon systems, such as the B-52
which was fielded in the 1960s, to receive updates and modifications throughout its
operational phase, the ICBM community did not integrate the best practices of the Air
Force with respect to life cycle management. Mr. Lawrence Kingsley stated in a 2014
interview that “The entire Air Force is aging, but while the rest of the Air Force moved
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on with sustainment, ICBMs did not…” (Rowell, 2014). One such example of the ICBM
community failing to modernize is the cost per flying hour concept.
Cost per flying hour is a common metric used by life cycle managers of aircraft to
forecast sustainment requirements (Sperry & Burns, 2003). As parts fail and require
replacement, costs per flying hour increase. This increase in costs can, in turn, be tied
directly to the flying hour program that is common among airframes. Each fiscal year the
Air Force determines how many flying hours on each airframe are required to keep pilots
proficient and ready for operational tasking. By knowing the cost per flying hour, the Air
Force can budget sustainment costs. Coupled with failure rate data, the Air Force can
also predict how many spare parts will be required to maintain the aircraft. Variability
plays a major role in preventing accurate models, but basic forecasting can be done to get
a general idea of what sustainment levels will be required to support each weapon
system.
Though this model was developed in the 1960s, it became prevalent throughout
the Air Force in the post-Cold War environment of the mid-90s (Rose Jr., 1997). This
was directly after the ICBM community transitioned under AFSPC which had limited
resources devoted to aircraft sustainment, unlike ACC which contained the nuclear
bomber force. It was not until nearly 20 years later that research considered developing a
cost per flying hour model for the MM III (Miller, 2012).
Another area where the Air Force modernized and ICBMs did not was within the
realm of maintenance data management. The Integrated Maintenance Data System
(IMDS), formerly known as the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS), is a
maintenance data collection tool that can aggregate maintenance data inputs at the
17

technician level to provide sustainment managers the information they needed to perform
life cycle management functions. Not only are serial numbered assets able to be tracked,
but failure rates and maintenance task data are stored and compiled in order to help
forecast future sustainment requirements. One intended use of IMDS is to link
maintenance and supply data in an effort to bolster the supply chain (Office of the
Secretary of the Air Force, 2007). IMDS also links to other sustainment and supply chain
management systems used by the Air Force. The 15 April 2007 version of Technical
Order 00-20-2 gives a description given to IMDS that is over two pages long detailing the
functionalities and capabilities that it provides aircraft maintenance and sustainment
personnel. Until the early 2010s, this was not the system used for documenting MM III
maintenance. Instead, the Improved Maintenance Management Programs (IMMP) was
the preferred tool for MM III maintenance data collection. Less than half a page is used
to describe the purpose, and intended use of IMMP and the description does not mention
integration with the supply chain other than allowing sustainment managers access to the
maintenance data.
In addition to a data management system that is not as robust as the Air Force’s
standard operating platform, the measurement of maintenance performance is lacking
within the ICBM sustainment community. The Air Force Maintenance Management
Handbook, first published in 2001, lays out the basis for the metrics deemed important to
unit-level maintenance leaders within an aircraft maintenance organization. Through this
handbook, sustainment managers seek to understand and describe the health of the fleet
using measurements and standards to gauge performance. The handbook also gives front
line supervisors a list of things to look for if the metrics begin to move in an undesirable
18

direction. However, nearly ten years after the aircraft maintenance community adopted a
robust metrics system, the sustainment community published the ICBM Maintenance
Metrics Handbook.
Additional review of the literature showed that since the 1990s researchers have
conducted substantial amounts of work towards how the reduction in strategic weapon
systems affects the concept of nuclear deterrence (Nyland, 1998) (Pedersen, 2009)
(Woolf, 2015). However, there is minimal literature on effective support operations (e.g.,
maintenance, supply chain operations, security) for the MM III. One example of a
research study to increase the effectiveness of maintenance resources investigated the
feasibility of an innovative inventory management technique to locate spare parts in the
missile field, thus potentially reducing the need to return to the main base if additional
spare parts are required during a maintenance task (Hughes, 2015).
Another area of research focused on effective security forces placements in order
to support maintenance operations (Dawson, Bell, & Weir, 2007) (Overholts II, Bell, &
Arostegui, 2009) in an attempt to optimize personnel utilization and increase maintenance
efficiency. Additional research sought to define the impact that a reduced alert rate
would have on maintenance personnel utilization rates (Kravitsky, 2007). Though these
areas of research are important, they pale in comparison to research done to support
maintenance and sustainment efforts throughout the aircraft community in the Air Force.
Reliability-Centered Maintenance
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) is a maintenance policy that relies on
probability to make informed decisions on when to perform maintenance. The goal of
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any maintenance action is to ensure that mechanical equipment can operate appropriately
when required (Moubray, 1997). This is defined by the user as the operating context of
the equipment. Whenever the equipment is no longer performing within that operating
context, the system experiences degraded capabilities, and thus maintenance actions are
required. However, with redundancy built into a system, degraded capabilities may not
cause system failure. Thus, the entire system may still be able to function appropriately
even though a subcomponent may have failed.
The goal of RCM is to create a maintenance policy based on system functionality
and operating context based on the design of the entire system. Over the past 60 years,
sustainment communities have changed their views on how components fail. Initial
failure models were based solely on an increasing failure rate as assets aged as indicated
by the pattern ‘B’ shown in Figure 2. With the increase in the mechanization of
processes, more attention has been given to industrial engineering which has identified
five additional failure curves. These additional failure curves more accurately model the
life cycle of mechanical systems and can be utilized to more accurately predict failure of
individual components.
Pattern ‘A’ is a bathtub curve which indicates components with a high rate of
failure early in its life cycle and after a certain amount of time begins wearing out at an
increased rate. Pattern ‘C’ indicates a steadily increasing rate of failure with no
significant increase due to wear out. Pattern ‘D’ is indicative of components that are
produced with a high level of robustness and thus do not have a high early failure rate
whereas pattern ‘E’ indicates a constant failure rate over the entire life cycle. Finally, the
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curve indicated by pattern ‘F’ is known as an infant mortality curve which models items
that have high early failure rates that reduce to a constant failure rate with time.

Figure 2. Six Failure Probability Curves (Moubray, 1997)
Combining these two concepts of understanding the operating context of the
system as well as its failure rates allows for the development of a reliability-based
maintenance concept. The basic concept of this is explained using Equations 1 and 2
whereby once the probability density function for failure is determined, the reliability, or
the probability that the system has not failed at time t, can be calculated. By
understanding what constitutes unacceptable performance (e.g. failure) and at what rate
that occurs, sustainment managers can then develop a preventative maintenance policy
based on their level of risk acceptance of a failure.

𝑡𝑡

𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡) = ∫−∞ 𝑓𝑓(𝑡𝑡)𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑

𝑅𝑅(𝑡𝑡) = 1 − 𝐹𝐹(𝑡𝑡)
Where:
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(1)
(2)

F(t) = the probability of failure before time t
f(t) = the probability density function for failure
R(t) = the probability of survival at time t
t = time

Through the understanding of when the risk of failure becomes unacceptable for
all critical components within a system allows for sustainment managers to set the overall
timeframe for preventative maintenance. As seen in many industrial settings, downtime
of a system due to maintenance causes a decrease in performance and prevents the
creation of products to sell, thus lowering profitability. In the power generation and
distribution industry, excessive downtimes can lead to economic losses which highlights
the importance of scheduling downtime to perform comprehensive preventative
maintenance rather than perform a run-to-failure maintenance model where downtimes
are more frequent even though they may be shorter in duration (Dehghanian, FotuhiFiruzabad, Aminifar, & Billinton, 2013). Thus, there is increased emphasis on using
RCM as a means to build a maintenance policy based on a determined level of risk
acceptance.
One of the earliest successes of developing an RCM policy came in the mid1970s when United Airlines adopted such a policy for the 20,000-hour inspection of their
new Boeing 747 aircraft. Under their old maintenance policy for the DC-8s (considered
to be a less technologically complex aircraft than the 747s), the 20,000-hour inspection
required over four million man-hours to complete. However, with RCM principles built
into the maintenance policy, United Airlines was able to complete the same inspection on
their 747s with only 66,000 man-hours (Moubray, 1997).
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Many industries have realized reduced costs and increased effectiveness by using
RCM since its inception in the 1970s. Within the military, organic research studies have
investigated utilizing these concepts on existing weapon systems such as the F-15
(Martin, 1997) and H-60 (Reeder, 2014). Additionally, these concepts are currently
being designed into new weapon system acquisitions.
A subset of the RCM model, known as Condition-based Maintenance (CBM), has
also been adopted by the military as a modernized maintenance concept. The basis for
this model is similar to that of RCM; however, it leverages technology to monitor the
performance of a system. Rather than using failure models to predict when failure may
occur, CBM uses operating tolerances as a means to determine when the operating
context of a component has degraded to a point that is unacceptable. Once the
component is outside the acceptable tolerance level, indicators are triggered to inform
sustainment managers that the system requires maintenance. A partial list of
technologies used in CBM to monitor condition are shown in Table 2 (Levitt, 1997).

Table 2. Examples of Proven CBM Technologies
Technology
Use
Chemical Analysis
Monitor oil contamination
Vibration Analysis
Monitor rotating components
Temperature Measurement
Monitor HVAC/Identify friction
Ultrasonic Inspection
Determine thickness of corrosion
Visual Fiber Optic Monitoring
Inspect hard to reach locations

By knowing when a system is out of tolerance yet still functioning, sustainment
managers can schedule maintenance before a failure occurs in a manner that allows for
multiple maintenance actions to occur. Additionally, monitoring specific component
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functions allows for maintenance personnel to know what component is out of tolerance
so that they can bring the correct tools and spare parts to repair or replace the component
rather than spend time troubleshooting the system.
A 1988 study illustrates some of the benefits of switching to a predictive
maintenance policy such as RCM and CBM. A survey of 500 manufacturing companies
across multiple countries and industries (i.e., electrical power generation, food
processing, textiles) examined the benefits gained through the successful integration of
predictive maintenance policies. The findings are summarized in Table 3.

Table 3. Benefits of a Successful Predictive Maintenance Program (Mobley, 1990)
Operations and Maintenance (O&M)
Maintenance Costs
Reduced 50-80%
Overtime Premiums
Reduced 20-50%
Spare Parts Inventory
Reduced 20-30%
Machine Performance
Machine Breakdown
Reduced 50-60%
Machine Downtime
Reduced 50-80%
Machine Life
Increased 20-30%

The DoD has outlined its policy pertaining to CBM in DOD Instruction 4151.22,
Condition Based Maintenance Plus (CBM+) for Materiel Maintenance, which states that
CBM+ be adopted by new weapon systems and that existing weapon systems should also
begin adopting these practices “…where it is technically feasible and beneficial”
(Department of Defense, 2012). It also defines CBM+ as:
CBM+ is the application and integration of appropriate processes, technologies,
and knowledge-based capabilities to achieve the target availability, reliability, and
operation and support costs of DoD systems and components across their life
cycle. At its core, CBM+ is maintenance performed based on evidence of need,
integrating RCM analysis with those enabling processes, technologies, and
capabilities that enhance the readiness and maintenance effectiveness of DoD
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systems and components. CBM+ uses a systems engineering approach to collect
data, enable analysis, and support the decision-making processes for system
acquisition, modernization, sustainment, and operations (Department of Defense,
2012).

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS)
is an example of how CBM can be integrated into a weapon system. Sensors embedded
within the aircraft continually monitor weapon system performance to indicate when
components and systems are not operating within tolerance. When this occurs, ALIS
alerts the supply chain and repair network to indicate a need for replacement parts and
manpower to return the airplane to a functional status.
Previous attempts within the DoD to implement a CBM+ maintenance policy
demonstrate the ability to produce multiple benefits. For example, an Army initiative to
develop a CBM+ strategy for a portion of their aviation branch produced notable benefits
in safety as well as weapon system availability. Specifically, a 9-12% reduction in
potential mishaps, as well as a 3.7-10.3% increase in readiness, was observed in aircraft
that had adopted a CBM+ maintenance strategy (OSD CBM+ Action Group, 2010).
Prospect Theory
Prospect Theory is an economics-based theory that focuses not just on decision
making under uncertainty, but also includes a propensity for loss aversion as a different
function of a decision maker’s level of risk. Unlike Utility Theory which focuses on the
expected utility gained from a decision, Prospect Theory expands to include the potential
for loss when faced with a decision as shown in Figure 3. In doing so, the theory
develops each decision to be framed from a reference point at the current state. As
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demonstrated by the theory, decision makers tend to favor decisions based on certainty
rather than uncertainty, even in a probabilistic environment (Slovic, Fischhoff, &
Lichtenstein, 1982). Thus, there is a propensity for individuals to insure themselves
against an event that has high probability and a low value of loss rather than insuring
against a low probability event with a high value of loss.

Figure 3. Prospect Theory Value Function (Kahneman, 2011)
Summary
Chapter II outlines the literature review conducted for this research. It explores
the nature of the MM III weapon system as well as a history of the nuclear enterprise. A
gap in progress between Air Force best practices and practices found in the ICBM
community was also explored. Additionally, the literature concerning RCM and CBM
concepts is compiled and summarized. Lastly, a summary of Prospect Theory is
provided as a means to introduce the theoretical lens used throughout this research.
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III. Methodology
Chapter Overview
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and outline the methodology used to
answer the research questions that were described in Chapter I. It outlines the case study
method for performing exploratory research and how those methods were applied to this
research. Lastly, it reviews the theories that were used as potential means to analyze the
collected information.
Data Collection
This research utilizes the case study methodology as a means to analyze the data
in an attempt to answer the research questions. This method was chosen due to the fact
that it is well suited for complex and poorly understood situations (Leedy & Ormrod,
2013). To understand the situation, data collection focused on compiling an extensive
collection of both primary and secondary sources. The research established proper
bounds so that extraneous data would not apply undue influence on the analysis of the
situation. These bounds focused on the people, policies, and procedures related to the
nuclear enterprise in general and ICBM sustainment in particular. Data sources
pertaining to topics such as organizational culture, nuclear weapon employment policies,
and operational effectiveness are considered to understand the climate of ICBM
sustainment throughout history for both the macro and micro-level view of the situation.
Additionally, data sources pertaining to these topics from multiple points in time are used
and grouped together into two timeframes to gain a complete understanding: 1947
through 1992 and 1992 to the present.
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Ultimately, the policies surrounding nuclear weapons start with how each
presidential administration views the role of nuclear weapons in their geopolitical
environment. As such, data sources explaining these views are used as the starting point
for each timeframe and explored further using the military’s interpretation and
implementation of these policies. Data collection also included sources that explained
how people, policies, and procedures were organized in order to meet the strategic
objectives of the United States. Where research failed to produce primary sources,
secondary sources were used as a means to fill in the gaps in research.
Organization of the Data
With a comprehensive collection of data sources, common themes and trends are
recognized after a thorough perusal of the sources pertaining to each defined timeframe.
This technique, as developed by Creswell’s 2014 work, utilizes a systematic approach to
analyzing the mass of data that often accompanies qualitative research. To do this, the
researcher organizes the data by timeframe and by topic. From there, data sources are
used to identify common themes and general descriptions that supported each other so as
to triangulate an understanding of the nature of the situation for each timeframe listed
above (Creswell, 2014). This triangulation was used as a procedure to ensure the validity
of the research method performed.
Developing the Context Using Theory
Next, these themes and trends are interpreted by exposing them to a theoretical
lens and determining how well the theory matched the historical context. By viewing the
themes through a theoretical lens, the bias is reduced in the research method (Leedy &
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Ormrod, 2013). Additionally, by using theory, a robust case for an explanation of why
the situations existed is developed. Prospect Theory, as listed in Chapter II, is used to
view the themes pertaining to the data sources up until 1992 as a means validate that the
theory accurately explained why events occurred in a certain manner.
Exploring the Current State
Because Prospect Theory was determined to accurately represented the past
environment of the nuclear enterprise, it is again used to analyze the data pertaining to the
current state. This analysis provides a way to synthesize the data into a coherent view
and to develop expectations as provided by the theory. These expectations, though not
predictive in nature, are used as a means to explore what the future state of the ICBM
sustainment community might look like under a reliability-centered policy for
maintenance.
From these future expectations, the research follows with a set of propositions on
how the ICBM sustainment community can achieve the future state using the Doctrine,
Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policy
(DOTMLPF-P) model used by military planners. These propositions attempt to link the
expectations of the current state, as described by Prospect Theory, and the benefits of an
RCM and CBM-centric maintenance policy.
Summary
Chapter III explores the methodology used to carry out the case study research
including the data collection method and how the data is synthesized into a holistic view
of the situation facing the ICBM sustainment community. Additionally, it explores the
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role of theory, specifically Prospect Theory, in the research and how it applies to create
expectations for the future state and propositions on how to achieve those expectations.
The results of this analysis are found in Chapter IV.
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IV. Analysis and Results
Chapter Overview
This chapter contains the case study analysis and results from this research. It
outlines the common themes from primary and secondary sources and analyzes those
themes through the theoretical lens described by Prospect Theory. This analysis is then
expounded upon through the development of propositions for how to progress using the
concepts of RCM and CBM as the basis for the future state.
Tuning the Theoretical Lens
The historical research related to the nuclear enterprise and ICBM sustainment is
analyzed to identify overarching themes that are then viewed through a theoretical lens.
To start, the directives from the presidents from the 1960s through the 1980s all discuss
the importance of having a credible ICBM force that can survive a first strike and be used
as an overwhelming retaliatory force. This is considered to be one of the strengths of the
MM III as identified in Table 1. The fact that the weapon system is always on alert aides
in its usefulness in providing a strategic deterrence (O’Rourke, 2010).
From these the presidential policy documents during the Cold War, the
Department of Defense and the targeting community developed a target list structure that
was dependent on the number of warheads available rather than having a set target
structure which would determine the required number of warheads on alert (Sauer, 2005).
This is known as the concept of maximum deterrence, where more on alert weapons
equate to a higher level of deterrence. This concept is supported by the SAC Munitions
Officer Handbook which states “Munitions functions must ensure maximum availability
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of trained personnel and [War Reserve Material] munitions to support wartime and
contingency operations” (Belisle & Hickman, n.d.). Thus, the clear theme under this
concept is that the goal of the nuclear sustainment community up until 1992 was to have
the most number of warheads available and set the target requirements to the capability
rather than to build a capability that matched the requirements.
Throughout the literature, there are references to ‘gaps’ in capabilities that fueled
the Cold War mindset. These gaps between the perceived Soviet capabilities in bombers,
weapon yields, missiles, and anti-ballistic missile systems led to increases in military
spending. These increases in military spending helped drive U.S. capabilities higher to
close these gaps and ensure high levels of deterrence (Higgs, 1988).
In order to apply a theoretical lens to this historical context, the concept of
deterrence as a substitute for value is utilized. Under Prospect Theory, value is
considered to be a measure of how an individual attributes the usefulness of the outcome
relative to their current position (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Thus, when value is
replaced with deterrence, the researchers found that Prospect Theory accurately describes
events during the Cold War.
The concept of risk aversion under Prospect Theory states that for a positive
value, decision makers prefer decisions with high probabilities of success to riskier
decisions with lower probabilities of an outcome that may produce higher value (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1992). When value is replaced with deterrence, the theory then states that
decision makers prefer decisions with a high probability of providing a known level of
deterrence to decisions that have a lesser probability to provide unknown levels of
deterrence. This is summarized as the concept of ‘this is the way we have always done it’
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where the higher probability of success in providing deterrence outweighs the desire to
seek out more effective operations where higher levels of deterrence are uncertain.
Through this historical context, the decision to increase warhead levels is the risk-adverse
method to provide maximum deterrence.
Applying Prospect Theory to the post-Cold War Environment
The literature concerning the post-Cold War exposes two common themes related
to the nuclear enterprise. The first theme concerns a fundamental shift in mindset to
valuing the cost of defense and deterrence over the absolute amount of defense and
deterrence provided where the second focuses on innovation to produce more effective
and efficient results. Before the end of the Cold War, the literature describes a situation
where the policy favored a level of deterrence which was supported by military
expenditures. However, with the end of the Cold War, the new policy focused on fixing
military budgets and optimizing the output provided by such levels. This is evident in
that military spending was relatively flat between 1993 and 1999 (Durham, 2015).
Additionally, in the post-Cold War environment, there were several efforts to reduce the
size of the nuclear arsenal. Though the first Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
was drafted prior to the end of the Cold War, Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama all
oversaw efforts to reduce the number of active warheads within the nuclear arsenal either
through treaties with Russia or unilaterally. In reference to one reduction of ICBMs for
compliance under START II, it was said that “These missiles may still have a role to play
in U.S. national security strategy, but they may not be needed in the numbers that were
required when the United States faced the Soviet threat” (Woolf, 2015).
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This sentiment is prevalent in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) conducted
under the Obama administration. One section of the NPR discusses the importance of the
nuclear triad and how it is a cost-effective method for maintaining deterrence. However,
with the aging infrastructure of the MM III force, the NPR states that a study is required
to “…consider a range of possible deployment options, with the objective of defining a
cost-effective approach that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while
promoting stable deterrence” (Department of Defense, 2010). Under this construct, it can
be seen that rather than operating under the concept of maximum deterrence, as
referenced above, the operating environment is one of minimum deterrence required.
Throughout the post-Cold War environment, the role of efficiency and
effectiveness became prevalent. Starting with the Quality Air Force (QAF) program of
the early 1990s and continuing to today through programs such as Air Force Smart
Operations for the 21st Century (AFSO21) and Expeditionary Logistics for the 21st
Century (eLog21), the Air Force has invested high levels of time and energy in order to
encourage innovation to increase efficiency and effectiveness throughout all operations.
As stated in Chapter II, the cost per flying hour model is one of many innovations
during the early stages of this push for efficiency (Rose Jr., 1997). Another source of
innovation comes from the adoption of Activity-Based Costing methods (ABC) at the
depots to more effectively track and understand costs in order to drive down waste
(Graves, 2001). The push for increased innovation is highlighted by statements from two
former Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, Generals Schwartz and Welsh, that “Every
Airman is an Innovator” which was also the theme of the 2014 CSAF reading list (Power,
2014).
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To overlay Prospect Theory on the current climate described above, the concept
of cost as the Y-axis is used to replace the concept of value rather than the previous
concept of deterrence. Thus, the new goal is to reduce the cost of sustainment. In doing
so, the theory describes a state where the Air Force has shifted from a risk-adverse to a
risk-seeking mindset. This is because the current state describes a certain level of
expenditure to meet the defense requirements. Thus, the cost of defense and deterrence
under the current conditions becomes a guaranteed loss. Stated differently, the costs
associated with the current state of operations are dollars that cannot be recovered nor
spent on other programs. However, Prospect Theory states that in this environment, riskseeking decision makers choose options that have a potential to reduce this loss rather
than stay with the guaranteed loss (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). When adjusted to the
concept of costs, risk seeking decision makers will make decisions that have the potential
to reduce costs rather than keep with the status quo and the known costs.
These concepts are illustrated using Figure 4 where the center square represents
the current way of operating. Within this area are the procedures and methods that are
currently outlined in Air Force Instructions (AFIs), Technical Orders (TOs), and other
policies that are approved methods. The second square that encases the central square,
representing alternate but unproven ways of operating, incorporates methods that would
be considered safe. However, these methods may or may not be more effective towards
meeting the end goal. The outer square represents alternative methods that would not be
considered even if they met the end goal.
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Figure 4. Conceptual Representation of Possible Processes

Under the risk-adverse environment of the Cold War where the goal was
maximum deterrence, the benefits of operating within the safe space outweighed the
desire to seek out alternative methods. This is because of the uncertainty that alternative
methods would lead to higher levels of deterrence and the possibility that they would be
considered an unsafe process. However, in the modern environment where the riskseeking mindset is prevalent, the goal is to be cost-effective. Thus, there is a greater
likelihood to seek out those alternative methods that are within the second square in
Figure 4 which are considered safe and also provide cost savings. This situation can be
described by the push for innovation in the post-Cold War environment as described
above. When applied to the nuclear sustainment community, it is seen that, until
recently, they have maintained the Cold War mindset of staying within the center square
of what is known and safe, (being risk-adverse) and are only now starting to pursue
innovative concepts found within the second square (risk-seeking).
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Analysis of the Current MM III Maintenance Policy
Because Prospect Theory describes the current state as one that is open to
innovation, this research focuses on concepts that could benefit the goal of driving down
costs within the MM III sustainment community. Currently, much of the maintenance
model for the MM III is under what is known as a run-to-failure policy where items are
replaced upon failure. Though there are periodic inspections and environmental sensors
to detect failures and abnormal conditions within the MM III system, they are not
necessarily predictive in nature. Additionally, because there are many systems and
components that make up the MM III, failure of a non-monitored item may not be
discovered until a scheduled inspection takes place which could be months or possibly
years after failure.
The AFI governing MM III maintenance describes a “find and fix” mentality
under the topic of Preventative Maintenance (PM) where maintenance personnel identify
discrepancies through periodic inspections and attempt to make repairs on the spot
(Department of the Air Force, 2017). Under this maintenance policy, the AFI describes
how preventative maintenance is conducted in response to a scheduled inspection where a
component is found to be out of tolerance. Because of the geographic separation between
the MSB and the LFs or the MAFs, many inspection intervals are aligned to reduce the
number of dispatches required.
This maintenance policy described above is considered to be the foundation for
the first generation (fix it when it breaks) and the second generation (scheduled
overhauls) concept of maintenance policies (Moubray, 1997). The main concern of this
first generation, run-to-failure maintenance policy is that it is considered to be the most
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expensive method to maintain a system due to high costs associated with spare parts and
high system downtime (Mobley, 1990). Though it may be appropriate for some
components within a system such as low-cost items, a one-size-fits-all maintenance
policy that primarily relies on a run-to-failure model has significant opportunities to
increase effectiveness.
Moubray’s third generation of maintenance policy focuses on utilizing RCM and
CBM concepts in order to bring attention to working effectively (‘doing the right job’)
rather than just efficiently (‘doing the job right’). This is because under the third
generation of maintenance the expectation of maintenance has evolved away from being
a ‘necessary evil’ and instead is seen as a means by which higher availability and
reliability can produce greater cost effectiveness (Moubray, 1997). Experts in the field of
maintenance management caution against an environment where the focus is solely on
efficiency and cutting costs without taking into consideration the effectiveness of the
overall maintenance strategy (Levitt, 1997). To combat this, the literature describes a
multitude of maintenance strategies and associated tactics used to carry out the strategic
goals.
From this analysis, two significant findings are discussed. The first is that the
environment within the Air Force as well as the nuclear sustainment community has
shifted away from a risk-adverse environment to a risk-seeking environment. Second,
though MM III sustainment efforts have realized gains in efficiency, there remains to be
found gains in effectiveness, especially within the maintenance policy employed.
Because of these two situations existing concurrently, it appears that the environment is
acceptable to seek out innovation to increase effectiveness.
38

This is not to say that new procedures should be adopted without going through
the proper vetting process for innovation. The concept of nuclear surety is where the
existing policies, procedures, and controls ensure that nuclear weapons are not involved
in any accidents, incidents, or unauthorized detonations (Department of the Air Force,
2016). Innovation without verification is dangerous and in direct violation of nuclear
surety. However, properly vetted innovation can lead to gains in efficiency as well as
effectiveness.
Statement of Propositions
As discussed previously, the prevailing goal in the nuclear enterprise is to provide
the proper level of deterrence in a cost-effective manner. Thus, more effective operating
methods must be sought out in order to realize additional cost savings. As such, the case
has been made that RCM and CBM techniques may be beneficial in achieving this goal
and are in line with current DoD policy. However, there are barriers to implementing
such a strategy that must be addressed before successful implementation can take place.
Therefore, this research develops a list of three propositions to further the discussion with
regards to how RCM and CBM maintenance policies may benefit the MM III
sustainment community. In doing so, these propositions help answer the research
questions listed in Chapter II.
The first proposition is that in order to develop a successful RCM maintenance
policy there should be a merger between reliability and readiness. Currently, there are
two methods to calculate the alert rate for the MM III weapon system. The first is the
Raw Alert Rate which is described by Equation 3 and the second is the Command
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Management Standard (CMS) Alert Rate as described by Equation 4 (Phillips et al.,
2011).

𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =

𝑇𝑇–𝑆𝑆–𝑈𝑈
𝑇𝑇

∗ 100%

(3)

∗ 100%

(4)

Where,
T = Total active inventory hours accrued
S = Total scheduled downtime hours accrued
U = Total unscheduled downtime hours accrued
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 =

𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎 –𝑈𝑈
𝑇𝑇𝑎𝑎

Where,
Ta = Total possessed hours accrued
U = Total unscheduled downtime hours accrued

These metrics are both lagging indicators to describe maintenance’s performance
in keeping the weapon system on alert. The CMS Alert Rate is calculated by removing
the weapon systems that are scheduled for maintenance and focusing instead on the ratio
of total hours on alert against hours attributed to unscheduled downtime. However, when
the variables are examined, it is seen that this metric is not a robust measurement of
maintenance performance or fleet health and instead returns an overinflated
representation of the facts. By only relying on the hours attributed to unexpected failures
as a ratio compared to the total hours attributed to the weapons that are on alert, single
failures are unable to reduce the available hours significantly. Compound this with the
fact that once the weapon system is scheduled for maintenance, it is no longer accounted
under the metric and that there are 150 assets per missile base, multiple failures
throughout the measurement timeframe must occur for the alert rate to drop below 99%.
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Therefore, actions by maintenance personnel have little impact on the CMS Alert Rate
metric and thus does not provide maintenance leaders with a meaningful lagging
indicator.
The alternative metric, the Raw Alert Rate, takes into consideration the total
number of hours that the entire fleet could be on alert subtracted by all hours that
individual weapon systems are not on alert. Taking into consideration the weapon
systems that accrue hours under scheduled and unscheduled maintenance, the metric
provides a measurement that indicated how proactive maintenance personnel are in
returning assets to a serviceable status. Thus, this metric is in line with a reliabilitycentered focus and can be used as the basis for an RCM policy. As seen in Figure 5,
there is a minimum number of LFs that must be alert at any given time to meet the
wartime requirements for the MM III fleet. This represents the minimum level of
reliability required for the MM III weapon system. However, due to modification
programs and other requirements, there is an expected number of LFs that will be off
alert at any given time. To ensure that the MM III force never falls below the minimum
required number, there is always expected to be a number of weapons on alert above and
beyond the minimum required level which is identified as the safety factor.
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Figure 5. ICBM On Alert Levels
When applied to RCM, sustainment decision makers can use this framework as a
method to select an appropriate reliability level which should be within the safety factor.
The higher the chosen reliability level is above the minimum required level, the less risk
there is in not meeting the wartime required number of weapons on alert. This allows for
an expected number of weapon systems to always be off alert and sets the desired
reliability level which would form the basis of an RCM strategy. Additionally, the
selected reliability level then becomes the goal by which the Raw Alert Rate can be
measured against to provide a more accurate view of maintenance performance and its
ability to meet required readiness levels.
The second proposition is that in order to properly implement a modernized
maintenance strategy, a decision matrix should be used to help identify what
subcomponents of the MM III should adopt RCM techniques, CBM technologies, or
remain under their current construct. As stated earlier, a one size fits all maintenance
strategy does not necessarily equate to the most effective way of maintaining a system.
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An example decision matrix from the literature is provided in Figure 6 as a means to
begin the identification process of what components may see increased value from
adopting an enhanced maintenance policy.

Figure 6. Example RCM Decision Matrix (Carretero et al., 2003)
To adapt this framework to the MM III, the current maintenance priority system
can be examined as a method to identify items that would likely not benefit from an
enhanced maintenance policy. Under the maintenance priority system discussed in
Attachment 2 of AFI 21-202v2, discrepancies that are Priority 5 through Priority 9 are
not considered to result in either a non-mission capable (NMC) condition nor a partially
mission capable (PMC) condition. Therefore, their criticality to the overall alert status of
the weapon must be negligible and thus would likely be cost-efficient to remain under its
current maintenance model. Therefore, it would be beneficial to add another logic device
at the start of Figure 6 that stated ‘Would the failure of the component result in a Priority
5 through Priority 9 discrepancy? If yes, run-to-failure, if no, continue to question 2.’
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Additionally, Attachment 3 of AFI 21-202v1 identifies the Mission Essential
Subsystem List (MESL) which contains those subsystems that would have an effect on
the alert status of the weapon if it became NMC or PMC. This would be a logical
starting point for going through this process of identifying what maintenance concept
would best fit the most essential subsystems within the MM III weapon system. Once
these decisions were made, the next step would be to follow the guidance outlined in
DODI 4151.22 to determine if there is a cost benefit to adopting either an RCM or CBM
policy for that subsystem. It should again be noted here that the benefits of adopting such
technologies before the full development of the GBSD program has economic value and
should not be ignored in this analysis.
The third proposition is that in order to sustain a high level of reliability, CBM
technologies should be researched for integration into the MM III. This is due in large
part to the layout of the MM III infrastructure. As explained in Chapter II, the MM III is
a geographically separated weapon system which spans thousands of square miles around
each MSB. While there are sensors currently installed within the infrastructure to alert
maintenance personnel of operating conditions that are not within approved tolerances,
they provide little diagnostic information. This means that maintenance personnel must
be dispatched to perform troubleshooting to identify specific components which have
failed and may not be equipped with the appropriate tools or replacement parts to return
the system to full alert status. By properly incorporating CBM technologies, maintainers
can be dispatched with greater knowledge of the condition of the weapon system and
potentially even know which component is faulty, thus reducing the amount of time
dedicated to troubleshooting.
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Another benefit of incorporating CBM technologies into the MM III has to do
with the replacement GBSD program. According to studies done on civilian aircraft,
almost 70% of items installed followed an infant mortality curve as represented by
pattern ‘F’ in Figure 2; whereas only 7% were modeled under pattern ‘D’ which showed
little to no early failures (Moubray, 1997). Though this does not directly translate to all
industries and components, it identifies a significant concern for newly developed
components. Components with high early failure rates increase the demand for
maintenance resources which could exceed the planned resource capacity which would,
in turn, lead to an increase in weapons off alert.
With the development of a replacement system in works for the MM III,
combating excessive infant mortality rates should be a focus. Monitoring these systems
using CBM technologies would lead to the ability to predict these early failures with
higher accuracy and in a timely manner rather than having an early failure and not be
aware of when it occurred. The expected result would be that a high alert rate would be
exhibited throughout the early failures due to the predictive nature of CBM technologies.
Additionally, by working towards the integration of CBM technologies and
policies before the installation of the GBSD produces two benefits. First, the policies can
be implemented and refined over the remaining life cycle of the MM III. This would
provide a longer timeline with which to roll out these changes so that the entire ICBM
sustainment community can adapt to the new policies in a well-planned manner. Second,
Total Life Cycle System Management (TLCSM) principles “…stress the importance of
early and strong emphasis on designing systems for supportability to facilitate operational
readiness, minimize the logistics footprint, and achieve best value operations and support
45

cost after system deployment” (Cothran, 2008). Current cost estimates put the GBSD
acquisition program at $62-$100 billion which, as stated in Chapter I, represents a
significant portion of future defense spending which would only increase if the
integration of CBM technologies is delayed until after the acquisition program is
complete (Mehta, 2016b). In fact, Evolutionary Acquisition (where small modifications
are made throughout the production cycle) and poorly defined initial requirements are
two of the leading causes of cost overruns identified in major DoD acquisition programs
(Porter et al., 2009). Thus, assimilating these technologies into the existing infrastructure
enables the GBSD to be designed around these technologies rather than attempt to build
them into the new infrastructure post-deployment and risk higher integration costs.
In addition to the two benefits listed above, there is a third potential benefit that
the literature suggests may be on the horizon. Current trends focusing on autonomous
design (Friedrich, Lechler, & Verl, 2014) and information technology (Manickam, 2012),
and potentially topics such as additive manufacturing and data analytics, have led
researchers to postulate that the fourth generation of maintenance is on the horizon.
Thus, modernizing the MM III maintenance policy to incorporate CBM should result in
being in a better position to capture the benefits from the transformation to a fourthgeneration concept.
Summary
This chapter describes the analysis performed during this research starting with
the selection of Prospect Theory as an appropriate theoretical lens and the application of
that lens to the data representing the timeframe up until 1992. An in-depth analysis
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shows how Prospect Theory describes the current state within the nuclear enterprise and
the ICBM sustainment community. Next, a review of the current maintenance construct
for the MM III is explored using Prospect Theory as a means to develop three
propositions to address the research questions from Chapter I.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview
This final chapter summarizes the findings from this research and their
applicability to the research questions posed at the beginning of this study. The role this
research will play in the future sustainment of the MM III is also explored. Finally, the
recommended actions and the potential for future research are summarized to aid those
following this path in setting up a starting point from which to further this research.
Conclusions of Research
Throughout this research the goal was to answer the two research questions posed
in Chapter I and listed here as a reminder:
1. Can MM III sustainment managers leverage RCM methods to provide the
required level of readiness at an appropriate cost?
2. Can existing CBM technologies can be applied to the MM III and GBSD in
order to effectively sustain the weapon systems?
From this research, it was found that since the end of the Cold War there has been a shift
away from a policy of maximum deterrence to one of minimum required deterrence.
Thus, the drive for increased cost-effectiveness combined with a lack of modernization of
the MM III maintenance concept has provided an opportunity for innovation to further
the goal of reducing sustainment costs while maintaining the required level of weapons
on alert.
The current maintenance construct has ensured that a high level of weapons has
been continually on alert providing constant strategic deterrence for over half a century.
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However, as the weapon system continues to age and O&M costs continue to rise the
importance of seeking out cost-effective ways of operating becomes more evident. As
such, RCM and CBM methods have been proven in multiple settings, both military and
civilian, to be able to reduce support costs while also maintaining and even increasing
system availability. From this, a set of three propositions were outlined to explore how to
begin the path from the current state to implementing RCM and CBM.
Significance of Research
As noted previously, successful RCM and CBM efforts that have been
implemented in a multitude of industries have been shown to provide real cost savings
back to the organization while also increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the
workplace. If applied appropriately to the MM III, the expectation would be that these
savings would also be seen at a significant level. Additionally, because the GBSD
program is in the early phases of development, early adoption of RCM and CBM will
allow sustainment managers to perfect these concepts prior to fielding the new weapon
system. This would also likely result in a cost savings because designing the new GBSD
around existing RCM and CBM infrastructure early in the development and planning
phases would be easier than attempting to integrate that infrastructure after the GBSD has
been fielded.
Recommendations for Action
From this research, there were three propositions that, if explored, would be able
to answer the research questions adequately. The first proposition, that there needs to be
a merger between reliability and readiness, outlined how taking existing metrics and
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shifting the goal from maximum deterrence to appropriate readiness would establish the
framework required for reliability levels required from the weapon system. The second
proposition, that a repeatable and proven decision matrix should be implemented to
categorize which enhanced maintenance concept should be pursued, attempted to link the
RCM and CBM literature with existing decision models already established for the MM
III. The third proposition, that CBM should be investigated in order to sustain high levels
of reliability, outlined how pursuing CBM technologies now would be able to ensure the
readiness of the MM III throughout the rest of its life cycle as well as have a robust
monitoring system in place to identify early failures of newly developed components
supporting the GBSD program. Further action in these three areas would provide further
support to the two research questions that formed the basis of this study.
Recommendations for Future Research
In addition to the actions outlined by the three propositions listed above, there are
areas within the context of this research that would benefit from further research. One
area would be to explore the concept of the fourth generation of maintenance and how it
applies to military systems in general and the ICBM sustainment community in
particular. Being on the leading edge of a transition would provide sustainment managers
with a competitive advantage and could be used as a benchmark for the rest of the DoD’s
sustainment community.
Another area that would benefit from further exploration would be to view the
problem of modernizing the ICBM sustainment community from an organizational
behavior perspective. Specifically, this would be through the social theories of change
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management. This research could explore what methods would be able to induce a
culture of innovation under the auspices of nuclear surety and the requirement to have a
safe, secure, and credible nuclear deterrence force.
Lastly, one of the limitations listed in Chapter I of this research was that the
ability for the associated supply chain network to meet a change in maintenance policy
would not be a part of this research. However, the link between maintenance and the
supply chain is one that is imperative to be functioning properly to support efficient
operations. Therefore, there would be significant benefit from further research exploring
how such changes in maintenance policy would affect the associated supply chain
network.
Summary
This final chapter summarizes the findings from this research. The significance
of this research towards sustaining the MM III weapon system through the rest of its life
cycle is illustrated as well as the potential benefits towards sustaining the future GBSD
program. It also discusses what actions and future research would be beneficial to further
build upon the themes explored in this research study.
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